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In the Philebus, Protarchus shows signs of self-awareness and easily admits 
when he is bafﬂ ed and needs help.  This type of awareness is associated 
with self-knowledge (sōphrosunē) and is expressed through Protarchus’ 
character in two ways.  First, he seems to have self-knowledge, in the 
conventional sense of the term, where sōphrosunē means knowing one’s 
own limitations.  This level of self-awareness is in conformity with the 
Delphic maxim, “Know yourself” (48c10).1  Second, in a moral context, 
sōphrosunē refers to the virtue of moderation or self-control, associated 
with the Delphic maxim, “Nothing in excess” (45e1).  Protarchus thinks of 
himself as moderate and recognizes the value of self-restraint with regard 
to pleasure.2  In this respect, he contrasts sharply with Philebus who has a 
reputation for excess which Protarchus thinks of as a personal deﬁ ciency 
and a moral vice.  He gradually separates himself from Philebus and by 
means of his agreement with Socrates, he espouses a view of pleasure that 
puts him in direct opposition to Philebus’ hedonism (65b-e, 67b).3
Protarchus’ image of himself as someone who knows his own place 
and is moderate in his pursuit of pleasure is very much at odds with the 
portrayal of his character and conduct in the dialogue.  Plato brings this 
discrepancy to our attention through the dramatic exchanges between 
Protarchus and Philebus and, in particular, through the dialectical argument 
Socrates gives on malice and comedy (47d-50e).4  In this paper, I examine 
the malice argument in which Socrates purports to explain why the pleasure 
that spectators feel when watching comedy is a mixed pleasure and pain. 
My thesis is that Socrates implicitly challenges Protarchus’ beliefs about 
himself as moderate and self-knowing.  There are two reasons to think 
that more is at stake in the argument than the mixed pleasure and pain 
of comic malice.  First, Socrates’ moral views are incorporated into the 
argument in conjunction with the conventional values to which Protarchus 
adheres.  Second, Socrates does little to explain how the pain-pleasure 
mixture works in terms of comedy.  I suggest that to understand Plato’s 
dialogues in terms of context and character is to discover to what extent a 
particular argument is designed to ﬁ t the exact needs required to educate 
the interlocutor about himself.
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I.
Philebus is an advocate of extreme hedonism who holds that pleasure is 
the good and for all beings the only value in life worth pursuing.  He 
associates himself and his cause with the goddess of love whom he calls 
Aphrodite (12b-c).5  Protarchus starts out as a moderate hedonist who holds 
the position that pleasure is one and the same and all pleasures are good 
(12a-13d).  The debate that originated between Socrates and Philebus is 
described by Protarchus in terms of what it is that Socrates denies: “You 
denied Philebus’ assertion that pleasure, delight, enjoyment and so on are 
the greatest good” (19c9-10).  By contrast, what Socrates claims is that 
the “good which should properly be called better than pleasure is intellect, 
knowledge, understanding and science, not to mention all their cognates” 
(19d3-5).
Philebus opts out of the discussion and hands things over to Protarchus 
who accepts the role as a matter of obligation since “our ﬁ ne friend 
Philebus has backed down” (11c8).6  While the positions are being set 
up, Socrates asks Philebus for his view and he claims that pleasure is the 
winner no matter what happens.  Protarchus admonishes him: “you should 
no longer take it upon yourself to agree or disagree with Socrates” (12a9-
10).  Philebus formally withdraws from the activities, calling upon his 
personal goddess as a witness to his resignation (12b1-3).  At a later point, 
Protarchus suggests that they not worry anymore about Philebus and “let 
sleeping dogs lie” (15c10).
After the preliminary skirmishes, Socrates and Protarchus face 
the problem of the one and the many, as it applies to both pleasure and 
knowledge, by means of the method of division which Socrates calls a 
“divine method” (16c-17a).  They are about ready for the task of dividing 
pleasure and knowledge into kinds but due to Socrates’ manner of 
questioning the project appears too daunting.  Protarchus is bewildered 
and asks Philebus how he thinks Socrates’ challenge should be answered. 
Protarchus recognizes that by calling for Philebus’ assistance after taking 
over the argument, he may be “making a fool” of himself and yet he says “it 
would be far more absurd, however, if neither of us were able to answer” 
(19a10-b1).  He is clearly aware of his role in the inquiry and contrasts 
himself with those who are wise, remarking that “although it’d be nice for 
the wise man to know everything, I think the next best thing for him is to 
have a proper estimation of himself” (19c1-3).
Socrates changes directions and posits a third alternative to resolve 
the standoff between pleasure and knowledge.  He suggests that they 
accept three conditions for what makes something good: completeness, 
sufﬁ ciency, and desirability (20d).  At a key moment, Protarchus is asked 
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to choose between two extremes: the life of greatest pleasures without 
intelligence or the life of intelligence without pleasure.  He unreﬂ ectively 
chooses the former position which holds that if one’s life is full of pleasure, 
and pleasure is guaranteed, there would be nothing more for a person to 
seek.  His choice is easily overturned when Socrates points out that the life 
of pleasure without the mind is the life of a mollusk (21c10-d1).  When he 
realizes his mistake, Protarchus admits to being speechless.  He embraces 
Socrates’ proposal of the mixed life as the best life.  He says the mixed 
life “will certainly be chosen by everyone…without exception” (22a6-7). 
Socrates shows his approval, stating that “to choose otherwise” would 
be a sign of “ignorance or some unfortunate compulsion” (22a8-9).  The 
mixed life has won ﬁ rst prize and Philebus’ pleasure-goddess must step 
down.  Convinced that pleasure has been demoted, along with knowledge 
and wisdom, Protarchus says that if pleasure does not win second place 
and is shown to be inferior to reason, then Philebus’ goddess, “would be 
altogether dishonoured in the eyes of [her] admirers: [she] would no longer 
seem so attractive, even to them” (23a6-7).7  Clearly, Protarchus exhibits 
amused pleasure at the defeat of Philebus’ view and Socrates wonders 
momentarily if they should continue in their “paining” of pleasure (23a5). 
Moving forward, Socrates proceeds to show why reason or intellect 
deserves to take second place whereby he introduces the four categories 
of being.8
These interactions show that Protarchus has a friendly rivalry with 
Philebus.  He also has an ambivalent attitude toward Philebus’ pursuit of 
physical pleasures.  In a subsequent discussion, Socrates appeals to the 
“dour thinkers” who are anti-hedonists and the “real enemies” of Philebus 
(44b5).  He describes people ill with fever who experience the strongest 
degree of pain before they get the pleasure of relief.  He places emphasis 
on the size and intensity rather than the number of pleasures and asks 
Protarchus to say whether the greater pleasures are those found in the 
unrestrained or restrained lifestyle.  Protarchus interprets the question with 
the maxim, “Nothing in excess,” and marks the “great difference” between 
those who follow the maxim and “fools and those who are unbalanced 
to the point of insanity.” Such people are the “pawns of intense pleasure 
which drives them to scandalous behavior” (45e1-4).9
They are now ready to consider the mixed pleasures of the soul, by 
itself, which are anger, fear, longing, grieving, love, jealousy, and malice 
or envy (phthonos, 47e1-4).10  Protarchus grasps how pains and pleasures 
are mixed with respect to anger and in tragedy but he wonders about comic 
pleasure.  Comedy is the hardest case to prove and if proved, it should 
make the other cases easier to understand.  Socrates pursues the inquiry 
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using the example of comic malice.  For purposes of analysis, I separate 
the argument in two parts.11
II.
Part I (48b-49c).  The argument begins with (1) malice is a “painful 
condition of the soul” and (2) the malicious person is described as someone 
who “is pleased at his neighbours’ misfortunes” (48b9-10).  Further, (3) 
there is a kind of ignorance which takes the form of misfortune or evil 
(kakon).  Ignorant people are in a “worthless condition” (ponēria) and 
are best described as conforming to the opposite of the Delphic maxim. 
Protarchus chimes in, “[D]o you mean ‘know yourself’?” (48c10). 
Socrates afﬁ rms this, adding that the more suitable way to put it is: “not 
to know ourselves at all” (48d2).  The negative use of the maxim serves 
to connect the ridiculous with self-ignorance which Socrates divides into 
three kinds.  He offers the following account.
People who are ridiculous due to self-ignorance think of themselves as 
rich, beautiful, or virtuous and wise (49a-b).  The latter group are the most 
common and suffer the worst of evils, especially those who think they are 
wise.  In a crucial move, the self-ignorant are divided into those who are 
strong and fearsome and those who are weak and harmless.  The latter are 
the most laughable since they cannot retaliate against those who ridicule 
them.  The combination of qualities, self-ignorant, weak, and harmless, is 
what makes for a truly comical situation.  So, (4) ignorance (including self-
ignorance) in those who are weak is, by nature, the most ridiculous of all 
(49b8-9).  Protarchus follows so far but doesn’t quite see “the connection 
with a fusion of pleasure and pain” (49c6).
Protarchus’ response is unsurprising since the emphasis is placed 
entirely on malicious pleasure to the neglect of malicious pain and on the 
object of ridicule rather than on the comic spectators.  Socrates started the 
argument with a partial deﬁ nition of malice.  The object of pain is another’s 
good fortune but it is never speciﬁ ed.  He brings in malicious pleasure by 
referring to the person who takes pleasure at another’s misfortune.  This 
approach shows that Socrates is not interested in a deﬁ nition of malice as 
painful or explaining its object or what it entails.  He directs attention to 
the pleasure of malice completely in terms of a disposition of character 
which allows for greater conceptual ﬂ exibility since the malicious person 
can admit of opposing states of mind.
Part II (49c-50e).  Protarchus asked for more details about the mixture 
and Socrates responds by examining the power or nature of malice. 
Malice is not only painful, (5) it is a kind of unjust pain and pleasure 
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(49d1).  This premise is linked to the supposition that malice must be 
directed towards friends rather than enemies since taking pleasure at the 
misfortune of enemies is justiﬁ ed.  Strictly speaking, then, it would not be 
called malice at all (49d3-4).  Premise (6) reads: it is not unjust to rejoice 
in one’s enemies’ misfortunes.  It is quickly agreed that (7) it is unjust to 
rejoice in the misfortunes of one’s friends.  Socrates recalls the claim that 
ignorance is a misfortune or evil for “whoever suffers from it” (49d8). 
He restates the three-fold classiﬁ cation of self-ignorance and the strong-
weak opposition from Part I which is formulated as (8): one’s friends 
who are self-ignorant and weak are ridiculous.  It should be noted that the 
comic context has been dropped and the real-life context is substituted. 
Then he asks, “Didn’t we say that what makes us feel pleasure at friends’ 
misfortunes is spite (malice)?” (50a1-2).12  I take this as premise (9): 
what makes (apergazomenon) one laugh at and rejoice in one’s friends’ 
misfortunes is malice which is painful.  Protarchus agrees.  To conclude, 
Socrates says:
Therefore the argument claims that when we laugh at what is 
comical in friends – when, that is, we mix pleasure with spite 
– then we are tempering our pleasure with pain.  For we agreed 
some time ago that spite is a painful condition of the soul; 
but we also agreed that amusement is pleasant, and on these 
occasions they both occur simultaneously. (50a4-9)
I read the conclusion as: (10) to laugh at and rejoice in one’s friends’ 
misfortunes is to mix pleasure with pain and on such occasions these 
feelings occur simultaneously.13  Finally, Socrates comes back to the 
tragic-comic framework and pronounces:
[S]o now we can be sure that in grief, tragedy and comedy – not 
just when they are portrayed on stage, but also in all the tragedy 
and comedy of life – pains and pleasures are mixed.  And the 
same goes for thousands of other cases. (50b1-4)
Protarchus’ ﬁ nal response has a tone of unconditional acceptance.  He says 
that it would not be possible even for someone who loves victory (ei kai tis 
philoneikoi) to maintain the contrary of this position (50b5-6).14
III.
I have two critical concerns.  The ﬁ rst is that Socrates’ use of “kakon” 
has a wider and narrower sense.  In premise (2), the word refers to 
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misfortunes as bad things that happen to people in the realm of external 
affairs or physical states, such as wealth, reputation, and health and how 
one fares with regard to them.  In premise (3), “kakon” is used to refer to 
the evils or vices of a man’s character.  The ﬁ rst usage prompts Protarchus 
to agree that the misfortunes of others are that in which the malicious 
person delights (48b9) and the second prompts him to agree that self-
ignorance, a worthless condition of the soul (ponēria 48c8), is an evil 
and misfortune (kakon 49a5, e7, 50a2).  It is typical for commentators to 
allow for the wider extension of misfortunes to accommodate Socrates’ 
meaning.15  Granting this point, however, overlooks a crucial issue which 
is that Socrates’ input is intentionally revisionary.  A dialectical argument 
is best interpreted as conveying two levels of meaning of a key phrase 
or concept, one is Socratic and the other is conventional.  The malice 
argument is not conducted as a refutation of Protarchus, but as a dialectical 
argument it works within a speciﬁ c context, derives its premises explicitly 
or implicitly, from his beliefs, and aims at a conclusion from the agreed-
upon premises which have implications for his moral character.
The argument depends on conventional values and uses a strategy that 
divides a pair of contraries into extreme opposites which appear to have 
no intermediate.  The strong-weak and friend-enemy dichotomies are false 
dichotomies.  Moreover, when Socrates says self-ignorance is a misfortune, 
it is clearly not with respect to external goods.  The narrow usage is made 
clear when Socrates says that self-ignorance with regard to knowledge 
cause dissension and strife among people who are in conversation.  Such 
ignorance is shameful and, by implication, if anything is deserving of 
comic ridicule, it is this case.16  Plato’s Philebus exhibits what Ruby 
Blondell refers to as “reﬂ exive relevance” which means that the dialogue 
dramatizes an issue to which the argumentation refers.17  Contrary to what 
Socrates says about self-ignorance being harmless to others and its popular 
association with those who are weak, Socrates holds that self-ignorance 
with regard to knowledge is harmful to oneself and to others.  In the comic 
context, a self-ignorant person being “harmless” acquires a conventional 
meaning: the ridiculed cannot get back at the ridiculer.  But this way of 
thinking is a concession to the argument’s context and does not represent 
Socrates’ moral viewpoint.18  Nonetheless, the comic context facilitates the 
transition to the second part of the argument in which Socrates challenges 
Protarchus’ beliefs about friendship.19
The second concern is that Socrates offers no account of the pain that 
grounds the malicious pleasure, whether taken by spectators laughing 
at a comedy or laughing at the display of a friend’s self-ignorance. 
Presumably, in the latter case, the pain would arise from one’s having 
89
Malice and the Ridiculous as Self-ignorance
envy towards the putative virtue or wisdom of one’s friend.  Protarchus is 
familiar with phthonos and shows no uncertainty about what it means.20 
On the whole, the Greeks had a negative attitude towards phthonos as 
socially undesirable and a sign of bad character and yet it was a pervasive 
feature of their politics.  Phthonos can be translated in English as malice 
or envy, depending on context, and both conditions belong to a family of 
emotions, including pity, indignation, and emulation.21  The conceptual 
boundaries between them are not clear-cut and translating “phthonos” into 
English as “malice,” “spite,” “ill will,” or “envy” makes it no less so. 
These words capture the painful side of phthonos adequately as do terms 
such as “begrudging” or “resentment,” but they fall short with regard to 
malicious pleasure.  Malicious pleasure, when taken to its farthest extreme, 
is referred to as “Schadenfreude” or what Aristotle calls “epichairekakia” 
which is to rejoice in another’s misfortunes without regard to just deserts.22
The rivalrous emotions involve how one feels about the fortunes or 
misfortunes and merits or faults of others in comparison to oneself.  The 
envious person may be of two types.  “Covetous envy” describes someone 
who desires the good things of another.  “Begrudging envy” describes 
someone who does not desire the good things for himself but wishes to 
see another deprived of them or is simply unwilling to share good things 
with another.  Envious feelings are rooted in rivalry and directed primarily 
against those whom one thinks are his equals.23  Given this understanding 
of the pain of malice, the pleasure is experienced whenever the victim 
whom the malicious person takes as his equal is perceived as suffering 
losses or defeat, or has his ﬂ aws publicly revealed.
In my interpretation of the dialogue, Protarchus is quick to move 
away from Philebus’ hedonism and detach himself from what he perceives 
to be Philebus’ bad fortune insofar as Philebus is shown to be wrong. 
Protarchus’ lack of awareness about his phthonos is linked to the reason 
Socrates brings in the friends-enemies dichotomy.  By means of the 
contrast between friends and enemies, Socrates suggests to Protarchus 
that if he is inclined to laugh at Philebus in a way that exhibits his malice 
or envy, then he ought not to consider himself a friend of Philebus.24 
Protarchus’ relationship of friendly rivalry to Philebus is an issue raised as 
part of the dialectical argument.  The feelings that are appropriate to have 
toward one’s enemies are conceptually close to phthonos and it was agreed 
that to have such feelings toward one’s friends is unjust.25  The important 
lesson for Protarchus in this regard is that feeling malice or envy reﬂ ects 
negatively upon his character and reveals his lack of self-knowledge.26 
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Notes
1 See Chrm. 164d-165b, Prt. 343b1-4, Alc I. 130c.  In the Phaedrus, Socrates 
explains: “I can’t as yet ‘know myself,’ as the inscription at Delphi enjoins, and so 
long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into extraneous 
matters” (230a1-3 [Hackforth (trans.)]).
2 Protarchus’ admissions of ignorance vary in tone and forthrightness, for 
instance: “I have absolutely nothing to say at the moment, Socrates: the argument 
has overwhelmed me” (21d5-6).  When Protarchus hesitates out of fear of giving 
the wrong answer and offending the gods, he turns to Philebus in the expectation 
that Philebus will come to his aid.  Philebus reminds him that he had wished to 
speak for himself.  Protarchus says, “Yes, I did, but at the moment I’m in a bit of 
a quandary.  I wish you’d be our seer, Socrates...” (28b7-8).
3 It is generally agreed that Protarchus is won over to Socrates’ viewpoint 
by the end of the dialogue.  See Hackforth (1972, p. 7); Benardete (1993, pp. 
102, 109); Frede (1993, pp. lxv-lxvii); Bolotin (1985); Wood (2007); and Bartlett 
(2008).
4 Scholars who discuss this passage include Patterson (1982); Mills (1985); 
Gadamer (1991, pp. 181-187); Tuozzo (1996); Russell (2005, pp. 188-192); and 
Miller (2008).
5 The ﬁ rst summary of his view is “for all living creatures the good is 
enjoyment, pleasure, delight and whatever is compatible with them” (11b4-5). 
Philebus’ position is formulated differently in keeping with the dialectical context 
as it changes and develops (11b-c, 19c-d, 60a-b, 66d-67b).
6 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are taken from Waterﬁ eld (1982). 
The Greek text consulted is Bury (1897).
7 Protarchus reveals his priority of honor over pleasure when he suggests to 
Philebus that he should be dislodged from his devotion to his pleasure goddess if 
she is dishonored.  
8 These are: (1) unlimited class, (2) limited class, (3) a mixture of both 
unlimited and limited, and (4) cause of the mixture (23c-27b, 30b).
9 Protarchus’ reversed attitude toward pleasure is best shown when he says 
that “pleasure is the greatest of impostors” (alazonistaton, 65c4) and when he 
likens pleasure to children, “utterly devoid of all sense” (65c10).  In the ﬁ nal 
analysis, it is Protarchus who says that sexual pleasures are “ridiculous, if not 
ultimately repulsive” (65e7-8).  These are translations by Fowler (1939).
10 There is no exact equivalent of “phthonos” in English.  The term may 
be translated as “malice,” “spite,” “ill-will,” “resentment,” “envy,” or “jealousy.” 
I use “malice,” following Hackforth, and prefer it over Waterﬁ eld’s “spite.” 
However, in my direct quotations from Waterﬁ eld’s text, I preserve his translation 
for phthonos as “spite.” The technical difﬁ culty of trying to hold to a single 
English term in various contexts is relevant to the overall argument of my paper. 
For discussion, see Hackforth (1972, p. 92), Russell (2005, p. 189, note 67), and 
Mills (1985, p. 2, note 2).  A recent study of all aspects of phthonos and phthonos-
terms in Greek culture is given by Sanders (2014).
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11 To make the structure clearer, a formal schema is presented below.
Part I
(1)  Malice is a painful condition in the soul.
(2)  The malicious person is one who takes pleasure at his neighbors’
misfortunes.
(3)  Ignorance (self-ignorance) is a misfortune.
(4)  Ignorance (including self-ignorance) in those who are weak is,
by nature, the most ridiculous of all.
Part II
(5)   Malice is a kind of unjust pain and unjust pleasure.
(6)   It is not unjust to rejoice in one’s enemies’ misfortunes and is
 not malice at all.
(7)   It is unjust to rejoice in one’s friends’ misfortunes.
(8)   One’s friends who are self-ignorant, weak, and harmless are
 ridiculous.
(9)   What makes one laugh at and rejoice in one’s friends’
 misfortunes is caused by malice which is painful.
(10)  So, to laugh at and rejoice in one’s friends’ misfortunes is to mix
pleasure with pain and on such occasions these feelings occur
simultaneously.
12 Sanders (2014, p. 103, n. 15) points out that Plato’s restriction of phthonos 
to friends, “goes too far: it would not have been normal, in Classical Athens any 
more than today, to take pleasure in the misfortunes of friends.”  Sommerstein 
(2009, pp. 108-109) notes a rare case of “those who should be friends behaving 
like enemies” in Aristophanes’ Wealth 838 and with regard to Knights 320, he 
remarks that “one may katagelan a friend if one is conﬁ dent that he will not think 
one is doing it out of ill-will.”
13 Mills (1985, pp. 1-2) presents a similar analysis of the argument.  His 
account is meticulous, however, he takes little notice of the dialectical context.  For 
instance, he ﬁ lls in Socrates’ omission of the deﬁ ning characteristic of phthonos in 
Premise (1) as pain taken at the “agathoi of neighbours and friends” (1985, p. 2). 
14 Socrates ignores Protarchus’ response and continues with a series of 
questions as to whether Protarchus grasps the gist of the discussion which he then 
proceeds to answer.  He explains that it was all about dealing with the hard case of 
comedy to ﬁ nd a pattern for the rest of the psychic pleasures.  It is difﬁ cult to say 
whether Socrates’ words of advice to Protarchus are to be taken seriously since 
Socrates begs off discussing the topic and promises to deal with it the next day.
15 Hackforth (1972, p. 95, n. 1) speaks to the difﬁ culty to be faced in 
translating kakon at 48c1-2 as an “ill thing.” Though he doesn’t say so explicitly, 
the concern is that the term must be used consistently if the argument is to be valid. 
He says, “Socrates uses the same word, kakon, for what we should naturally call 
a trouble (or misfortune) and a vice (or moral defect).” Hackforth thinks there is 
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no “real equivocation” in the Greek because kakon can refer to either concept as 
the context determines it.  In English, however, we need to use different words to 
capture the correct sense.  See also, Gosling (1975).  His note at 48b11 highlights 
the term “misfortune” about which he says, “no English will catch the Greek, 
which covers defects of character, weakness, and misfortune indifferently” (1975, 
p. 120).
16 In Republic V, Socrates points out that in the past it was considered 
ridiculous for men to exercise in the nude until it was proved to be best.  He takes 
this to show that “it is foolish to think anything ridiculous except what is bad, or to 
try to raise a laugh at any other spectacle than that of ignorance and evil as being 
ridiculous, as it is foolish to be in earnest about any other standard of beauty than 
that of the good” (452d7-e1 [Grube (trans.)]).
17 Blondell (2002, p. 374) uses the Statesman (283b-287b) which is lengthy 
and tedious in its account of due measure, as her prime example.
18 Socratic moral thinking on justice, harm, and the friends-enemies 
dichotomy occurs at Rep. 335a-d; Crito 49a-e, and Grg.  469a-c.  See Blondell 
(2002, p. 194) for her remarks about friendship as a part of the dialectic between 
Socrates and Thrasymachus (Rep. 498c-d).  She makes a point about the 
“slipperiness” with which Socrates uses language when it comes to friends and 
enemies.
19 Xenophon’s Socrates is presented as dealing with conventional wisdom 
about phthonos in an unconventional way (Memorabilia, III.9.8).  Xenophon 
writes that it is a “species of distress, but not the sort that arises over the misfortunes 
of friends or the good fortune of enemies; he said that only those people were 
envious who were distressed at the success of their friends.”  The context provides 
help; continuing: 
When some people expressed surprise that anyone who cared 
for a person should be vexed at his success, he reminded them 
that many people are so disposed towards certain others that 
they cannot ignore their troubles, but go to their help when they 
are unfortunate, and yet are annoyed when they are fortunate.  
This, he said, could not indeed happen to a sensible person, but 
was the constant experience of the foolish. (p. 162 [Waterﬁ eld 
(trans.)])
20 For various occurrences of “phthonos” and the speciﬁ c contexts in 
which the term is used by Plato, see Ap. 18d, 28a; Eu. 3c-d; Grg. 457d2; Laches 
184b10, 200b5-7; Lysis 215d2-3; Prt. 316d2-3, 320c1-2; Rep. 460b2-3, 500a3-5, 
500b10-c1; Phdr. 247a7, d3-4; Sym. 209d2, 210d8, 213d2-3; and Tim. 27d, 29e1-
2.  A useful discussion of Plato’s concern with phthonos and aphthonos is given 
by Herrmann (2003).
21 Cairns (2003) shows the difﬁ culty of marking off the boundaries 
between envy and indignation (nemesis).  He points out that due to its negative 
connotations people tend to “transmute” their malicious feelings “into something 
more acceptable” (2003, p. 238).  Further, to accuse another of envy is a common 
political tactic and this makes “for a degree of conceptual inexactitude: to 
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reformulate indignation as envy or vice versa may be to allow some of the attributes 
of the one to count as attributes of the other” (2003, p. 238).  He notes, also, that 
envy and jealousy are similar in that both contain “an element of ‘begrudging’” 
which shows that “envy is one aspect of a wider spectrum of attitudes” (2003, 
p. 238).  David Konstan (2006, pp. 111-128) also discusses the relation between 
envy and other rivalrous emotions.
22 Aristotle, Rh. II.9.1387a1, N.E. II.8.1108b1-5.  For detailed remarks on 
epichairekakia in relation to phthonos, see Stevens (1948) and Halliwell (1991).  
23 Aristotle’s discussion of phthonos in Rhetoric II.10 emphasizes this point. 
He says “we compete with those who follow the same ends as ourselves: we 
compete with our rivals in sport or in love, and generally with those who are after 
the same things; and it is therefore these whom we are bound to envy beyond all 
others” (1388a12-16 [W. Rhys Roberts (trans.)]).  Translations of Aristotle are 
taken from J. Barnes (1984).  Socrates cites Hesiod in this regard in Plato’s Lysis 
215c-d.
24 See Halliwell (2008).  He makes the point that emotional ambivalence 
is particularly noticeable in the way the young behave toward each other, e.g.  it 
seems playful and fun but this may cover over feelings of envy or resentment.
25 In Greek tragedy, laughing at one’s enemies and the fear of being laughed 
at by one’s enemies are common motivations for conduct, e.g. Euripides’ Medea 
380, 404, 797, 1049, 1355, 1362 and Children of Heracles 939-40.  With regard 
to divine nemesis or phthonos, Athena’s punishment of Ajax in Sophocles’ Ajax 
is extremely harsh and Odysseus shows pity rather than malice at the sight of it 
(120-133).  In Philoctetes, Philoctetes worries about divine phthonos as he hands 
the bow of Heracles to Neoptolemus (775-778).  Benardete (1993, p. 203) calls 
attention to divine jealousy as “prompted by hubris” in light of the meaning of 
self-knowledge.  In the Philebus, the theme of divine phthonos or nemesis is 
presented dramatically when Socrates expresses trepidation about the proper way 
to address the gods and goddesses (12c-d, cf. 28a-b).
26 I wish to thank Scott Aikin for his comments which were insightful and 
delivered in the ﬁ ne spirit of comedy.
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